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Abstract
Disruptions in the bulk power grid can result in very diverse consequences that
include economic, social, physical, and psychological impacts.  In addition, power
outages do not affect all end-users of the system in the same manner.  For these reasons, a
risk analysis of bulk power systems requires more than determining the likelihood and
magnitude of power outages; it must also include the diverse impacts power outages have
on the users of the system.
We propose a methodology for performing a risk analysis on the bulk power
system.  A power flow simulation model is used to determine the likelihood and extent of
power outages when components within the system fail to perform their designed
function.  The consequences associated with these failures are determined by looking at
the type and number of customers affected.  Stakeholder input is used to evaluate the
relative importance of these consequences.  The methodology culminates with a ranking
of each system component by its risk significance to the stakeholders.  The analysis is
performed for failures of infrastructure elements due to both random causes and
malevolent acts.
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21. Introduction
The electric supply system in North America including the United States, Canada,
and a small portion of Northern Baja, Mexico, can be viewed as consisting of three parts:
the generation of electric power, the transmission of electricity, and the distribution of
electricity to the end-users.  The bulk power system is the generation and transmission
portion of the system.  The term ‘bulk’ refers to the large amounts of electric power
carried by the system before it is distributed to the end-users [1].
The bulk power grid is an international system that is divided into three major
regions.  These regions are collectively known as the NERC (North American Electric
Reliability Council) Interconnections and include the Eastern Interconnection, the
Western Interconnection, and the ERCOT (Electric Reliability Council of Texas)
Interconnection.  The Eastern Interconnection services the U.S. states and Canadian
provinces east of, and including, the Great Plains region.  The Western Interconnection
provides power to states and provinces west of, and including, the Rocky Mountain area.
The smallest interconnection, ERCOT Interconnection, covers the majority of Texas.
These interconnections exhibit strong connectivity within themselves but are only weakly
connected to each other.
Electric power supports almost every aspect of our daily lives, either directly or
indirectly, and has become an integral part of our national security and economy. A
diverse set of end-user groups constitute the customers of the bulk power.  These users
include individual citizens, manufacturers, financial networks, communication
companies, transportation networks, medical facilities, government agencies, and gas and
water supply infrastructures.  The bulk power grid forms the transportation backbone
through which power flows from generation facilities to the distribution networks that
ultimately supply power to most end-users†.
In light of recent events, such as the 2003 Northeast Blackout, and the prevalent
dependencies on electric power, it is recognized that a large disruption in the bulk power
system, either due to random events or intentional attacks, may result in widespread
consequences.  These consequences could include economic, social, physical, and
psychological impacts.  The blackout of the Northeast on August 14, 2003 affected over
50 million people and has been estimated to have had an economic impact between $4
billion and $10 billion in the United States alone [2].
There is a large amount of literature that analyzes failures in the bulk power
system as they impact the economy.  Zimmerman et al. [3] have developed a
methodology that employs the economic accounting concept.  The methodology uses cost
factors to assign a monetary value to the consequences (loss of life, business losses, and
loss of services) that may result from terrorist attacks on the bulk power system.  The
authors then combine these dollar values into a single measure, the economic impact,
which is used to evaluate the risk terrorist attacks pose to the power grid.  Greenburg [4]
illustrates the use of this methodology by developing a terrorist attack scenario on the
New Jersey electric power supply network and evaluates the impacts on the New Jersey
economy.  The economic impacts of the August 14, 2003 Northeast Blackout as stated in
[2] were also based on economic evaluations of metrics that included spoilage of
perishable goods, cost of power not provided, lost productivity, disposal of goods in
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3production during power outage, extra wages for employees, and equipment restart
expenses.  As stated earlier, there are various types of impacts (social, physical, and
psychological) that accompany economic impacts with failures in the bulk power grid,
some of which may be socially unacceptable to be assigned a dollar ‘cost.’
Analysis of past blackout data [5] show that outages and disturbances follow a
power law distribution with a tail that shows that larger blackout frequencies decrease as
a power function of its size.  This is contrary to the previous belief that the frequencies of
major blackouts decreased exponentially.  Chen et al [6] confirm this distribution, and its
tail, by analyzing NERC data of power outages that date back to 1984.  Carreras et al [7]
further investigate this distribution of blackout sizes by looking for critical loading points
in electric power systems.  They present an electric power transmission model that
represents loads and generators as nodes of a network and use linear programming to
analyze the network. Load shedding is observed as the load demand of the system is
increased and the capacity of supply is held constant.  This study shows that there are two
transitions that define a critical loading that greatly increases the risk of major blackouts.
One transition occurs when the load demand overcomes the total capacity of generation.
A second transition occurs when load demand causes the transmission lines to become
overloaded.  Criticality of electric transmission systems was verified by Nedic et al. [8]
using AC power modeling.
There are also studies that look at ‘hardening’ effects of the bulk power grid
against terrorist attacks.  Salmeron et al. [9] use non-linear programming to construct a
power flow model that establishes the load flow of an electric power grid system.  Lines
are then attacked, or removed from service, and the power flow model is used to
reestablish a stable configuration with portions of the system’s load not served.  The
effects on the system are tracked as multiple lines are removed from service.  These
results are used to find the optimal applications of available resources to harden the
system and minimize the effects of terrorist action.  Bier et al [10] introduce a linear
programming algorithm that also solves this optimization problem of applying available
resources to the power grid with similar results as the previous work.
Engineers at the Duke Power Company have proposed a value-based approach to
investment planning regarding upgrades to the power system [11].  Their methodology
looks at the expected cost of proposed improvements and the expected cost to customers
of future outages without this improvement.  They combine the customer cost and
investment cost to determine the minimal value over a time period using discounting of
future costs.  The lowest value of the combined cost determines the appropriate time to
make the improvement to the transmission system.  To do this, the engineers look at the
likelihood of future outages, the possible effects of these outages, and the cost imposed
onto the customers if these outages occur.  This work looks at the direct economic impact
to customers that result from power outages but not the social, physical, and
psychological impacts.
This paper focuses on analyzing the risks associated with the bulk power system
using the viewpoint of an electric utility company.  Section 2 summarizes our past work
on risk assessment which is the basis for the methodology developed and applied to the
bulk power grid in Section 3.  Section 4 offers a discussion of the results and, finally,
Section 5 offers several concluding remarks.
42. Risk Assessment
2.1 Overview
There are three components that make up risk in a technological system.  These
are the sequences of failures that can lead to undesirable consequences, their likelihood of
occurrence, and the consequences that accompany these failures.  This triplet definition
of risk was proposed by Kaplan and Garrick [12] when they defined risk as the answers
to the following three questions:
• What can happen?
• How likely is it to occur?
• What are the consequences?
There are methods, such as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA; also called
Quantitative Risk Assessment - QRA), for answering these three questions in complex
but well defined systems such as nuclear power stations, chemical processing plants, and
space systems [13].  For large, national infrastructures, these methods need to be adapted
to the infrastructure’s technological and sociopolitical complexities [14].  Garrick et al
[15] outline a possible application of PRA techniques in the analysis of infrastructures.
They point out that the full application of these techniques requires the development of
processes by which private and government bodies will be able to share data freely.   The
difficulty in applying these methods to the risk assessment of infrastructures is further
exacerbated when terrorism or malevolent acts are to be considered due to problems with
determining the likelihood of a successful attack.  The assessment of the likelihood that a
terrorist attack will occur requires information on the intent, capability, and resources to
carry out the attack.  Given that a group possesses these traits, determining the point, or
points, of attack requires knowledge of the goals, beliefs, and desires of the group.  The
probability of the attack being successful depends upon the quality of countermeasures in
place to deter or combat the attack [16].  For these reasons, the MIT methodology (to be
described shortly) assumes threats of appropriate levels for the analysis and leaves the
likelihood of attack to the agencies responsible for collecting intelligence [14].   The risk
assessment of infrastructures presents additional difficulties due to their diffuse nature.
To answer the first two risk questions when dealing with infrastructures, the ideas
of vulnerabilities and threats are used.  Haimes [17] defines these two terms as follows:
“Vulnerability is the manifestation of the inherent states of the system (e.g.
physical, technical, organizational, cultural) that can be exploited to adversely
affect (cause harm or damage to) that system.”
“Threat is the intent and capability to adversely affect (cause harm or damage to)
the system by adversely changing its states.”
We adopt these definitions in this paper.
2.2 The MIT Methodology
Apostolakis and Lemon [14] develop a screening methodology for diffuse
infrastructures and rank vulnerabilities to terrorism.  The authors apply their methodology
to the water, electric power, and gas distribution systems on the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT) campus.  The methodology requires the stakeholders to determine
the importance of possible consequences that may result from successful attacks on these
infrastructures.  These consequences include impacts on public image, Institute
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PRA question (what can happen?), these authors go beyond the usual consequences that
are related to health, safety, and economics. The stakeholder group in this work is a
multidisciplinary team that includes decision makers of the MIT Department of Facilities
with expertise in finance, utility operations, and space planning [18].
 The stakeholder input is used to create a value tree that reflects the stakeholder
views.  A minimal cut set (mcs) approach is used to identify and analyze vulnerabilities
in the infrastructures.  The consequences resulting from successful attack on the
vulnerabilities are then applied to the value tree to determine the stakeholder impact
(value) each vulnerability represents.  Apostolakis and Lemon point out that determining
the likelihood of a terrorist attack is very difficult and is best left to the security and
intelligence agencies.  Their work assumes a “minor” level of threat to be present.  The
work then determines the susceptibility of each mcs to this level of threat by looking at its
accessibility and security measures.  The susceptibility of each mcs is then combined
with its value for ranking.  The result is a ranking that requires a mcs to have both a high
susceptibility and a high value to be placed higher in the ranking.
Michaud and Apostolakis [19] expand this methodology by analyzing a water
supply network for an entire city.  The authors use network theory and component
capacity to analyze the water supply infrastructure rather than the mcs approached
employed in Reference 14.  Michaud and Apostolakis also expand the methodology by
including the duration of system failures in their analysis to capture the time dependence
of the consequences resulting from failures in the infrastructure.  These authors do not
look only at terrorist acts on the infrastructure but split the threats to the system into
mechanical (random) failures and malevolent acts.  This allows the analysis to rank the
infrastructure elements according to their impact on the stakeholders when these elements
fail randomly and when they are disabled by malevolent acts.
Patterson and Apostolakis [20] further develop the MIT ranking methodology by
identifying critical locations within multiple infrastructures.  Critical locations are those
where an attack will affect more than one infrastructure.  The authors apply the
methodology to the chilled water supply, domestic water supply, steam supply, natural
gas, and electric power infrastructures on the MIT campus.  The Geographic Information
System (GIS) is employed to determine the geographical layout of each infrastructure.
GIS also provides extensive data on the infrastructure user groups identified within the
work.  Due to the larger number of infrastructures and users included in the analysis, the
authors use Monte Carlo simulation and importance measure concepts for the analysis of
each infrastructure.  The authors borrow the concept of importance measures from PRA
[21- 22] and they generalize it to include the stakeholder values.  Each infrastructure is
analyzed independently to assign to each location a value of the new importance measure
the authors call Geographic Valued Worth (GVW).  Once each infrastructure is analyzed,
the GVWs from each infrastructure for a given location are summed to determine the
location’s overall GVW.   These GVWs are used to rank the various locations.
The next section describes the MIT methodology, as it applies to the bulk power
grid, in detail.  Details of the grid and customer groups used in the work are also
provided.
63. Methodology
3.1 Overview
The MIT risk ranking methodology is a systematic process to analyze failures in
an infrastructure and rank them according to their impacts on the stakeholders.  The work
presented in this paper is the result of collaboration between MIT and Sandia National
Laboratories to apply the methodology developed in [14, 19, and 20] to the bulk power
grid.  The stakeholders used in this presentation are five members of an electric utility
company.  Figure 1 illustrates the methodology.  Although details will be provided later,
a brief overview is given here.
The methodology begins by identifying assets and components of the bulk power
infrastructure that will be included in the analysis.  Analysis of the infrastructure is then
performed using the Sandia AC load flow simulation model [23] to determine the
physical consequences resulting from the failure of the components.  The consequences
include the number and type of customers affected, and the duration of the power
outages.  These consequences are input to a value tree that incorporates the stakeholders’
views of possible impacts.  The value tree is then used to determine the impact the
consequences have on these stakeholders.  The amount of impact a component represents
to the stakeholder is its value.  Each component value is then combined with its
susceptibility to failure or attack.  The combination of value and susceptibility is then
used to rank the components according to their risk significance.  The following
subsections describe the process of this methodology in detail.
3.2 Infrastructure Elements
The IEEE 1996 Reliability Test System (RTS-96) [24] is a test grid that has been
established to evaluate bulk power reliability analysis techniques.  The system does not
resemble any portion of the North American power grid but has been developed to
provide a universal standard that could be used for diverse applications [24].  The single
area RTS-96 is used as the study grid for our application.
The single area RTS-96 grid (Figure 2) contains 24 buses and 38 transmission
lines.  The buses consist of 9 load only buses, 8 load/generation buses, 3 generation only
buses, and 4 transmission buses (no load or generation on the bus).  Reference [24]
provides data for generators, buses, and transmission lines that include capacities, failure
rates and probabilities, mean times to repair/failure (MTTR/MTTF), and line lengths.
However, there are no established customers associated with the RTS-96 grid.  This
requires that an artificial customer set be created and placed on the grid for our work.
We introduce four customer groups: Residential customers, Commercial
customers, Small – Medium Industrial customers, and Large Industrial customers.  These
customer groups were selected based on Edison Electric Institute [25], which identifies
the customer groups as Residential, Commercial, and Industrial.  The Industrial customer
group was split into two groups, small – medium and large, so that the differences
between these customer types could be included in the analysis, e.g., the impact due to
down time, equipment re-start time, and the loss of product that results from power
interruptions as discussed in the IEEE Gold Book [26].
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average usage data [25] and the load history for the system [26].  These customers were
added to each group until the load capacity of the RTS-96 was reached.  Table 1 shows
the customer loading.  To simulate diversity within the grid, the customers are not placed
in the same ratio among the groups on each bus.  These customer groups were developed
and applied to the grid prior to the infrastructure analysis.  For application to an actual
portion of the North American power grid, an assessment of the customers on the grid
would be required.  This assessment could be done using the utility company’s customer
data or by surveying the area which the analysis would cover.
The infrastructure elements whose failures will be investigated are the generators,
buses, and transmission lines that make up the bulk power grid.  The threats to these
elements include both random failures and malevolent acts.  Malevolent acts are the
intentional disruption of the infrastructure by purposely preventing a component from
carrying out its designed operation.
Single-failure scenarios are used as the failure scenarios in the presentation of this
methodology.  As for attacks, only minor threats are considered.  Minor threats are
threats, such as vandalism or employee sabotage, that have the ability to attack a single
infrastructure asset, but do not possess the ability to attack multiple assets with a
coordinated attack.  Even though the failure of multiple components would likely have
larger consequences, the likelihood of multiple failures may decrease significantly, a fact
that would offset partly their importance or value in the ranking process.  This single-
component limitation was made in part due to the limitations of the model used to
analyze the power grid at this time and due to the rapidly increasing number of
combinations of simultaneous events.  If the present work included an actual portion of
the North American power grid, the investigation of higher-order vulnerabilities would
need to be covered to include coordinated attacks on multiple targets, as well as
concurrent failures of two or more assets.
3.3 Infrastructure Analysis
The infrastructure analysis of the bulk power grid employs an AC load flow
simulation model developed at Sandia National Laboratories [24].  For input into the load
flow model, the single area RTS-96 is modeled as a network that includes the buses as
nodes and the transmission lines as arcs.  Node data include the real and reactive power
generating capacity, the real and reactive power load demand, the customer loading, and
the peak load history for each day in a 52 week year (364 days).  Arc data include the
voltage and current capacities [24].  The load flow model is currently limited to modeling
only one generator per bus.  Work is underway to update the program’s generator
modeling characteristics and allow for the modeling of multiple generators on each bus.
The analysis presented in this work combines the total generating capacity on each bus
and treats it as a single generator.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the power systems analysis.  Grid analysis
begins by selecting a system component (generator, transmission line, or bus) to be failed
and the time frame for the analysis.  The analysis time frame can be any time length
between one day and 364 days (the entire load history period).  This allows the analysis
of the bulk power grid to be performed using varying seasonal data, such as the effects of
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component failures during extreme cold/hot seasons.  The number of days selected in the
time frame will be the number of simulations run for the selected component.
Transmission Line 4 is selected as the failed component along with a time frame of 21
days and will serve as the example throughout this section.
The load flow model uses a series of steady-state AC simulations to estimate the
effects that an initial, single-component failure has on the entire infrastructure.  This
multiple-step, quasi-transient approach has the ability to follow the progress failure of the
system by identifying components in the grid that experience conditions outside of their
limits, e.g., transmission lines that experience over-current conditions, and are then
tripped off line.  The model’s crude simulation of cascading failures can result in the
initial, single-component failure causing more load shed than a normal stability analysis
would conclude. This model is admittedly imperfect but was used here to facilitate the
proof-of-concept application of the methodology.
The power flow model begins by initializing the system with a stable flow for the
first day of the time frame.  To do this, the system loading for the day is determined by
the load history data provided in the RTS-96. The day’s peak load is assumed to last the
entire day.  A stable flow is established when the existing load is being supplied with
power from available generators and each transmission line is within its voltage and
current capacities.
Once the system is in a fault-free, stable condition, the selected component is
failed (Transmission Line 4 for our example).  The introduced fault of the selected
component causes a disturbance in the power flow.  The simulation model adjusts the
generated power at each generator to attempt to regain a stable flow in response to this
disturbance.  Power is adjusted until the generating capacity is reached or the load is met
on each bus, which ever occurs first.  The current and voltage on each transmission line is
tracked during this power adjustment.
Any transmission line that has a voltage below its limit requires load to be shed in
order to bring the line voltage within specifications.  Load shedding is done in 10%
increments of the total bus load.  This incremental load shed is done to simulate the
segregation of load by the various branches leaving the bus in the distribution system.
This simplifying assumption is made due to the RTS-96 not possessing an established
distribution system that further carries the electric power from the bulk power grid to the
end users.  If an actual portion of the North American bulk power system were analyzed,
where the distribution system is identifiable, the increments of load that may be shed at
each bus would be determined by the configuration and priority of each branch in the
distribution system.  After each transmission line voltage is verified within its limits, the
current on each line is investigated.
The simulation model identifies the transmission lines that are carrying a current
above its limit.  Transmission lines with excessive current will be tripped out of service
and will require additional adjustment to the load flow.  Any adjustment to the load flow
will require the transmission line voltages to be reevaluated as in the previous step.
Once a stable load flow has been reestablished, the amount of load shed at each
bus is recorded within a load shed vector and the simulation is repeated for the next day
in the time frame or terminates if the time frame is complete.  To complete the analysis of
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remaining component using the same time frame.
The load shed vector is an N-dimensional vector that represents the effect the
failed component has on the system with N being the number of buses in the grid.  N is
24 for the single area RTS-96 grid.  Each element of the load shed vector is the
percentage of load at its respective bus that has been shed to regain stability in the
system.  The elements that correspond to a transmission bus (no customers present on the
bus) will always be zero.  Since the simulation can encompass several days, a separate
load shed vector is produced for each day of the simulation time frame.  Our example
time frame is 21 days; therefore, 21 load shed vectors are produced for the failure of
transmission line 4.
The affected component, the number and type of customers affected, and the
duration of the power outages make up the physical consequences of system failures. The
type and number of customers affected by load shedding is determined by the load shed
vectors.  It is assumed for the RTS-96 customer base that the customers on a bus are
evenly dispersed over the distribution system branches (10% increments) of the bus.
That is, if a bus experiences a 20% load shedding during a failure scenario, 20% of each
customer group on that bus will be shed to meet the load shedding requirement.  The
duration of the power outage is determined by the failed component.  The duration of a
failure scenario is assumed to be the component’s mean time to repair (MTTR) or
permanent outage duration time as specified in the RTS-96.  For our example,
Transmission Line 4 is the failed component so the duration of the scenario is 10 hours.
This time equates to the required time to repair the line and is listed as its permanent
outage duration time listed in [24].
As mentioned previously, the time frame selected for the analysis determines the
number of load shed vectors calculated for each component in the system.  Due to the
system load history (a different peak load for each day), these load shed vectors for a
single component may vary throughout the time frame.  We assume that the load shed
vector that results in the largest amount of load shed is the representative vector for the
component.  The customer portion of the physical consequences of losing Transmission
Line 4 is given in Table 2.  The zero elements of the load shed vector are omitted since
there would be no load loss on their associated buses.  Shedding a portion of a single
customer is not allowed; for this reason, there are no large industrial customers lost upon
failure of Transmission Line 4.
3.4 Value Tree and Constructed Scales
The value tree is based on multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) and provides a
hierarchical view of the impact each failure scenario may have on the stakeholders.  The
value tree consists of three levels in which the top level is the overall impact, or value, of
a failure scenario (Figure 1).  The second level breaks this overall impact into broad
categories called impact categories (IC).  The ICs are further reduced in the third level to
specific aspects, called performance measures (PM), that specifically describe the various
ways consequences result in impacts to the stakeholders.  Each PM is divided into
various levels of impact called the constructed scales (CS).  The levels of the CSs
represent the amount of impact the physical consequences have on the stakeholder
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through each PM.  The levels for each CS range from no impact to complete impact to
the PM.
The value tree is constructed using stakeholder input regarding the ways in which
they may be affected by system failures.  This is done by the stakeholders defining the
ICs, PMs, and CS that make up their value tree.  Once the value tree is formed, the
stakeholders’ view of importance regarding each IC, PM, and CS is modeled.  The
importance modeling is done by assessing the stakeholders’ beliefs using pairwise
comparisons.  These comparisons are then used in calculating the weights for the ICs,
PMs, and each level in the CSs.  The IC and PM weights represent their contributions to
the overall impact.  The weight of a CS level represents the amount of impact felt by the
stakeholders when the physical consequences result in that level.  Since the impacts felt
by the stakeholders are negative impacts, the amount of impact is referred to as the
disutility.
For each failure scenario, the physical consequences result in a CS level being
impacted for each PM.  The PM weights and disutility is then used to determine the
overall impact felt by the stakeholder.  The overall impact of a scenario is called its
performance index (PI) and is used in the component ranking process.
The construction of the value tree and its weights used for the present work are
presented here as an example of this methodology.  The CSs used in this work are then
discussed followed by an example of the process used to determining the PI of each
failure scenario.
The stakeholders who participated in the construction of the value tree are five
members of a regional electric utility company affiliated with the management and
transmission departments at the company, Table 3.  They worked together to form the
value tree in a workshop.  Input for the weights associated with the value tree was
provided independently by each member.  The input provided by the senior participating
member, referred to as S-1, will be the primary input for this work and is presented as the
example in this section.  The input provided by the remaining four members (S-2 through
S-5) will be discussed in the next section and used as a sensitivity analysis on the
application of the methodology.
Figure 1 contains the value tree that represents the consensus of the five
stakeholders (excluding the weights).  Economics, Image, Health & Safety, and
Environment were defined as the ICs and were deemed sufficient to encompass all
possible impacts felt by the company following a failure in the power grid.  Economics
was divided into Lost Revenue, which accounts for the financial impacts due to power not
supplied during an outage, and Repair/Replace, which is the cost associated with
restoring the failed component.  Image defines the impacts to the company’s image
following an outage and was split into the company’s Political, Public, and Customer
image.  Political defines the impact system failures have on the local, state, and federal
authorities which may propose additional regulations on electric generating and
transmission companies.  Public refers to the general public’s view of and confidence in
the company’s ability to provide reliable power.  Customer defines the company’s
relationship with non-residential customers and is assumed to be directly tied to the
customer’s incurred cost due to a power outage.  Health & Safety was divided into
General Public and Utility Workers.  General Public is meant to account for the effects
on the public when power outages affect medical facilities, emergency response services,
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transportation networks, and daily life conveniences such as heating and cooling a home.
Utility Workers accounts for the increased safety concerns of the company regarding its
employees that are responsible for repairing the failed component.  Environment was
assigned a single PM which is Fauna.  Fauna defines the effect failure scenarios have on
the wildlife in the region with specific consideration to fish population linked to the
operation of hydroelectric generators.
To evaluate the weights present in the value tree, the participating members were
provided surveys in which they performed pairwise comparisons between the ICs.  They
first identified which ICs they felt were more important and to what extent.  This process
is shown in Figure 4 (using the input provided by S-1).  For example, this stakeholder
judges that the IC Health & Safety is equally or slightly more important than the IC
Environment.  The same stakeholder believes that the PM General Public is weakly to
moderately more important than the PM Utility Workers with respect to Health & Safety.
It is very important to point out that the stakeholders have already been informed about
the possible ranges of the consequences and are making their evaluations being fully
aware of these ranges.  In the present case, it was the consensus that the potential impacts
of failures on both Health & Safety and the Environment were very small, unless a major
catastrophic event disrupted a majority of the grid.  The stakeholder assessments were
made under this assumption.
The stakeholder input is placed into a matrix and the weights are determined
using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [27].  Although several methods exist in the
literature for evaluating weights [28], this method was used because the stakeholders find
the pairwise comparisons easier to implement.  The AHP results were scrutinized to make
sure they represented the stakeholder views.
The CSs used for this work are presented in Table 4 – Table 7.  AHP is also used
for the determination of the disutility for each level of the CSs.  Disutility is a
monotonically non-decreasing function that defines the amount of impact a level in the
CS has on its PM.  For this reason, the disutilities in each CS range from no impact
(0.0000) to complete impact (1.0000) of the PM.
To determine the level in which physical consequences impact the stakeholders,
the physical consequences are mapped onto the CSs of each PM.  The mapping technique
used is determined as shown in Table 8.  Sum means that the effects on each customer
group are determined and then summed to determine the level of impact.   The
consequence matrix follows the approach presented in [19] where the effects on each
customer group are determined and then the customer group that results in the highest
level of impact is chosen as the representative group for the PM.  Component specific
means that the level of impact is determined solely by the failed component in the failure
scenario.  Inspection means that the effects a failure scenario has on the infrastructure
itself and not the customers is used to determine the level of impact.  An example of each
mapping technique is presented here using our example failure scenario (Transmission
Line 4, with a 21-day time frame) to help clarify the process.
Sum is only used by the Lost Revenue PM.  Each customer group has an
associated average energy consumption (kWh) and rate charged per unit of energy
consumed ($/kWh).  The physical consequences give us the number of customers in each
group that is affected and the duration of the outage.  Using this information we have:
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where;
$ is the resulting lost revenue
n is the number of customer groups included in the analysis (four in our case)
Ni is the number of customers in group i
Ri is the rate charged to a customer in group i
iU  is the average electric power usage for a single customer in group i
T is the duration of the scenario
The lost revenue for our example is $140,525.  This results in transmission line 4 being
placed in level 3 for Lost Revenue which has a disutility of 0.1761 to the stakeholder
(Table 4).
The mapping technique (Table 8) “Component Specific” will be illustrated using
the Repair/Replace PM.  The cost to restore a failed component depends on the
component itself and the way the component failed.  The component may be able to be
repaired or might be required to be replaced, depending on the level of damage to the
component.  The cost should include the price of repair parts as well as the cost of
equipment used and wages paid due to the man-hours required to restore the component.
Company historical data may also be used to evaluate the average cost to restore a type of
component and to determine its impact.  Here, we assume that the cost to restore a
transmission line does not exceed $50,000 but is no less than $10,000.  This assumption
is based on the required cost to repair a transmission line by looking at the labor of the
worker, equipment operation cost, and material cost associated with the repairs.  This
puts Transmission Line 4 into level 2 for Repair/Replace which has a disutility of 0.0687
to the stakeholder.
The consequence matrix requires the construction of a matrix that relates the
duration and number of customers affected by a failure scenario to the CS.  This is done
by evaluating the response of the customer groups to past power outages of various sizes
and durations.  We use discrete estimates of magnitude and duration of the physical
consequences to determine the expected impact level for the CS.  The consequence
matrix for the Customer PM is provided in Table 9 for our example.  The physical
consequences for Transmission Line 4 (Table 2) lead to a level 3 impact based on
Commercial, a level 3 based on S-M Industrial, and a level 0 based on Large Industrial.
Since the maximum level among all groups is a level 3 impact, transmission line 4 is put
into level 3 with a 0.3317 disutility to the stakeholder (Table 5).
The mapping technique “Inspection” is used only in the Fauna PM and is focused
on the effects caused during power production increases at hydroelectric facilities that
result in an impact on the local fish population.  As power is increased at a hydroelectric
generator, more water is forced through the generating house which results in less water
that is allowed to bypass.  Affecting this ratio of power production and bypass flow has
effects on the fish population in the river.  For this reason, the amount of power increase
at these facilities and the duration of this power increase are the factors that affect this
PM.   Since the output of the simulation model (load shed vectors) did not directly give
the increase in power production at each generation location, this information is
determined through inspection.
(1)
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The difference between the amount of load shed and generation disconnected from the
grid during a failure scenario is used to determine the increase demand placed on the
generators remaining connected to the grid.  It is also assumed that any increase in
demand will be shared among the remaining generators.  This difference in the amount of
generation disconnected and load shed is used to create a unique consequence matrix for
this PM and is presented in Table 10.  The values in this matrix represent the amount of
excess load that will be placed onto the remaining generators, including the hydroelectric
facilities.  If a failure scenario results in more load shed than generation disconnected, or
if the hydro plants are disconnected from the grid, the effect on the Fauna PM is
evaluated at a level 0.  Transmission Line 4 results in a generation lost to load shed of -
174 MW which results in a level 0 impact with a 0.0000 disutility to the stakeholder.
To determine the performance index (PI) of a failure scenario, we use Equation 2
[14]
∑
=
=
PMK
1i
ijij dwPI
where
PIj is the performance index of failure scenario j
wi is the weight of performance measure i
dij is the disutility of performance measure i and failure scenario j
KPM is the total number of performance measures
Table 11 gives an overview of the level of impact to each PM along with the PM weights
for our example failure scenario (stakeholder S-1).   Using the disutilities, PM weights for
S-1, and equation 2, the resulting PI for Transmission Line 4 is 0.0884.  This PI
represents the value the failure of Transmission Line 4 has to S-1.
3.5 Ranking
The work presented up to this point has been focused on determining the value of
failure scenarios in the bulk power grid.  So far, the first and third questions of risk
assessment have been answered.  The second question (likelihood) remains to be
addressed.
To review before we continue, there were two types of threats addressed by this
methodology, random events and minor malevolent acts.  As discussed earlier, while the
likelihood of random events is determined by the scenario frequency, the likelihood of
malevolent acts is not addressed by this methodology but, rather, the susceptibility to an
assumed threat is evaluated [19].
For random failures, the frequency of a failure scenario is multiplied by the
scenario’s value to determine the expected disutility to the stakeholder.  As described in
[19], the random failures of the infrastructure elements are then ranked according to their
expected disutility.
For malevolent acts, the “susceptibility” of a component is judged subjectively by
accessing the quality of security measures and openness of the component.  Reference
[14] proposes six levels of susceptibility to malevolent acts ranging from completely
secure (the lowest level) to completely open (the highest level).   These susceptibility
levels are given in Table 12.
(2)
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As proposed in [14] each component’s PI and susceptibility are combined in order
to assign the component to a vulnerability category.  This process is illustrated in Table
13.  The vulnerability categories are shown in Table 14.
The present work assesses transmission lines to have an extreme susceptibility
(Level 5) due to their openness and remote locations.  Buses are assessed to have
moderate susceptibility (level 3) due to safety fences and possible video surveillance.
Generators are usually located at facilities with security forces and high authorized
personnel traffic.  For this reason, generators are assessed to have a very low
susceptibility (level 1).
To complete our example of the failure of Transmission Line 4, its random failure
frequency is 0.39 failures/year.   Multiplying this frequency with its PI, we calculate the
expected performance index for this transmission line to be 0.03448.
The susceptibility category for transmission lines is extreme and Transmission
Line 4 possesses a moderate PI, which results in the line being assigned to the Orange
category for vulnerabilities (Table 14).
4. Discussion
4.1 Stakeholder S-1
The input provided by stakeholder S-1 is used to determine the baseline results for
our analysis of the RTS-96 single area grid.  S-1 valued Economics and Image as the
most important impact categories and this resulted in the Lost Revenue, Political Image,
and Customer Image performance measures being the dominant contributors to the
overall value of each failure scenario.  The top ten components ranked by their risk
significance with respect to malevolent acts and random events are provided in Table 15
and Table 16, respectively.
An in-depth look at the results for the vulnerability rankings shows that there are
two major reasons for T-16 and T-17 being placed at the top of the list.  These
transmission lines connect the upper portion of the grid, where the majority of the
generation is located, to the lower portion of the grid.  When these lines fail, they limit
the amount of power that can be transmitted to the lower portion of the grid causing the
transmission lines in the lower portion of the grid to become stressed by increasing their
loading.  This increased loading results in Transmission Line T-5 becoming overloaded
and tripping thus increasing the scenario’s impact on bus 6.  This results in a large
number of customers being shed.  Transmission lines T-16 and T-17 also have extremely
long power outage durations due to their long repair times.  This combination of duration
and magnitude causes a high-level impact to both Political Image and Lost Revenue.
Another interesting result of the vulnerability ranking for S-1 is that the amount of
load shed alone does not determine the order in which the components are ranked.  This
observation is illustrated by the components ranked #6 through #10.  The last two
components of the ranking, B-3 and B-4, result in very large load sheds.  However, T-14,
T-15, and T-13 are ranked higher even though they result in a smaller load shed.  This is
due to the transmission lines having a much longer outage time.  The duration is the key
factor here that elevates their impacts to stakeholder S-1.  It should also be noted that the
varying distribution of customer groups at affected load busses and the associated
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variations in impacts also contribute to a nonlinear relationship between the load shed
and the disutility of a failure scenario.
Looking at the results for the random failure events, high failure frequency was
the dominant consideration for the rankings.  Transmission line T-13, ranked #1, is one of
two lines that connect a remote load bus, B-6, to the grid.  Upon failure of T-13, only
moderate load shed results due to the other line connected to B-6 having the ability to be
loaded more and minimizing the impact.  However, due to its relatively high failure
frequency, T-13 represents the most expected disutility to stakeholder S-1 by resulting in
moderate impact to Lost Revenue and Customer Image.  The components that resulted in
higher load shed usually were associated with very low failure frequencies which reduced
their expected impacts to S-1.
It was expected that the value of each generator would be high given the
limitation placed on the modeling of generation at each bus.  It was also expected that the
buses would result in large consequences due to the load directly connected to the bus
being completely lost when it fails.  The infrastructure analysis did result in a large
amount of load being shed when a bus or generator was selected as the initial failed
component, which would have caused them to stand out in a conventional stability
analysis of the grid.  However, transmission lines are the highest ranked contributors with
respect to both random events (expected disutility) and malevolent acts (vulnerability) for
stakeholder S-1.  As discussed above, this is due to the fact that the amount of load shed
is only one of the factors that determine risk significance.  In general, the high
susceptibility level (extreme) and higher failure frequencies of the transmission lines are
the key factors that elevate them in the rankings above the other types of components
even though the amount of load shed is usually smaller.
4.2 Sensitivity Evaluation
To determine the sensitivity of the results to the input provided by the various
participating members, the component rankings were produced using each stakeholder’s
input.  The rankings from each stakeholder are then compared to evaluate their
differences.
As shown in Table 17, the five stakeholders’ views of importance of the ICs
include many differences.  This provided very strong differences in the weights of each
performance measure.  The top ten components ranked by their vulnerability level and
expected disutility for each stakeholder are presented in Table 18 and 19, respectively.
The results of the comparisons between the component rankings of the
stakeholders are surprising.  Each stakeholder’s vulnerability ranking results in very
similar results with few differences in the components identified, the order of the
components, and the vulnerability levels associated with each component within the
rankings.  Inspection of the effects each IC has on the overall value for each stakeholder
resulted in the following findings:
• The Economics and Image ICs are more sensitive than the other ICs to the range
of physical consequences that can result from component failures in the grid.
• The Health & Safety and Environment ICs have very little influence on the overall
failure scenario impact unless the physical consequences include a lengthy
duration and/or a very large number of customers are affected by the scenario.
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Even though S-3, S-4, and S-5 rank Health & Safety and Environment highly, the higher
level of these ICs are not affected until the physical consequences reach a very large
scale.  In order to impact these higher levels, almost half of the power grid would need to
be shed which did not occurred in this study.  This was in line with the consensus reached
at the input elicitation workshop that the impact to Health & Safety and Environment was
small unless a catastrophic event takes place.  Without the higher scales of these IC being
affected, the Economics and Image ICs are the key factors that determine a component’s
value.  This results in similar random event and malevolent act rankings of the
components among all stakeholders.
5. Concluding Remarks
The methodology presented in this paper provides a systematic process that
produces a ranking of the elements within the bulk power grid for random failures and
malevolent acts.  This ranking is not solely determined by the amount of load shed when
a specific component experiences failure. Rather, the multiple aspects that make up the
risk a component failure poses to the system, as determined by the impacts to the
stakeholders, are used to determine the ranking.  The reasons for each component’s
position in the rankings are identifiable and can be traced back to the stakeholder
preferences and the infrastructure itself.  These results should be viewed as a first input to
a deliberation by the stakeholders in which their reasonableness of the rankings is
debated and the assumptions of the analysis scrutinized [29].  The results of this analysis
process are also stakeholder dependent.  Any other stakeholder, such as a federal agency
like the Department of Homeland Security, could include additional PMs and discard
some that we have included in our study.  However, the methodology is unchanged and
would result in a component ranking appropriate for the new stakeholder’s views.
There are several areas in which additional work is required to improve the
analysis.  The identification and modeling of more specific customer groups would
improve the value assessment of each component in the grid by allowing a more specific
look at the effects on customers during power outages.  Customer prioritization for load
shedding would also increase the accuracy of the analysis by not including the customers
that pay a premium for more reliable service in most load shedding scenarios.  
Application of this methodology to an actual portion of the North American
power grid would also provide the realism needed to generate more support for the
methodology.  The power flow simulation model is in its infancy and is being improved
regarding its generator modeling capabilities and load shedding scheme.  This will allow
the results for forced outages of generators to be more realistic.  Further improvements to
the model will also include mitigation measures to minimize load shedding to better
reflect the application of such in the industry.  However, it should be noted that the
methodology is model agnostic, and therefore a more sophisticated load flow model
could be easily substituted in the future.
It is also realized that placing each component into a susceptibility level but its
type is also not completely realistic, such as all buses in the Moderate susceptibility level.
This assumption eliminates probably the most significant risk to a substation, the
intentional vandalism of transformers.  To increase the accuracy of the analysis, the
analyst must identify each component’s susceptibility on a case by cases basis.  This was
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not possible with the application of the RTS-96 single area grid due to the limited data
provided for each component.
This paper’s purpose is to present the MIT risk ranking methodology as it applies
to the bulk power grid.  The load flow simulation model and the analysis of the RTS-96
test system used in the presentation of this methodology is not the focal point.  Analysts
of a real power grid are not bound to perform the infrastructure analysis in the manner
described here and may choose any method of analysis suitable to meet their needs.  The
assumptions made in this paper are sometimes broad and may appear to oversimplify the
analysis.  By incorporating a more comprehensive assessment of the disutility of various
failure scenarios, we do believe that the methodology presented here has advantages over
the traditional contingency analysis performed today by many utilities and could
potentially provide the industry with a more consistent and meaningful way to identify
critical assets, as may be required under the new NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CIP) standards.  Future work will evaluate the application of this methodology to a real
power system in collaboration with a utility partner.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Methodology overview.
Figure 2: Single area IEEE RTS-96 grid (Ref.  24).
Figure 3: Infrastructure analysis overview.
Figure 4: Example of stakeholder input.
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Figure 1: Methodology overview.
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Figure 2: Single area IEEE RTS-96 grid (Ref.  24).
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Figure 3: Sandia Load Flow Model Analysis Overview [23].
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Instructions:
1. Compare the two items listed; circle the item that you feel i s the most important.
2. Indicate how much more important the circled item is using th e scale provided:
1 – equally     3 – weakly     5 – moderately     7 – strongly     9 – extremely
Use even numbers to indicate importance between these increments .
Impact Categories
1. Economic vs. Image
2. Economic vs. Health & Safety
3. Image vs. Health & Safety
4. Environment vs. Economic
5. Environment vs. Health & Safety
6. Environment vs. Image
Economics:
1. Lost Revenue vs. Repairs
Image:
1. Public vs. Customer
2. Public vs. Political
3. Customers vs. Political
Health & Safety:
1. General Public vs. Utility Worker
2
2
2
4
4
4
6
6
6
4
4
Figure 4: Example of stakeholder input.
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Table Captions
Table 1: Customer data per bus.
Table 2: Customer portion of physical consequences for transmission line 4.
Table 3: Participating members’ affiliation with the electric utility company.
Table 4: Constructed scales for Economics performance measures.
Table 5: Constructed scales for Image Performance Measures.
Table 6: Constructed scales for Health & Safety performance measures.
Table 7: Constructed scales for Environment performance measures.
Table 8: PM mapping techniques.
Table 9: Consequence matrix for Customer PM
Table 10: Matrix for Fauna PM.
Table 11: Impacts to each PM for transmission line 4.
Table 12: Susceptibility levels of infrastructure elements.
Table 13:  Susceptibility and value combinations for each vulnerability category.
Table 14: Infrastructure asset vulnerability categories for ranking element failures due to
malevolent acts.
Table 15: Top 10 components ranked by vulnerability level for S-1 (minor malevolent
acts).
Table 16: Top 10 components ranked according to their expected disutility for S-1
(random failures).
Table 17: Value tree weights (rankings) for each IC and PM by stakeholder.
Table 18: Top 10 components ranked by vulnerability level for all stakeholders.
Table 19: Top 10 components ranked by expected disutility for all stakeholders.
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Industrial Customers
Bus
Load
(MW)
Residential
Customers
( # )
Commercial
Customers
( # )
Small – Medium
( # )
Large
( # )
1 108 38,680 6,200 375 1
2 97 35,806 5,690 265 0
3 180 83,200 6,800 945 1
4 74 13,920 6,000 355 0
5 71 21,300 4,700 280 0
6 136 60,932 5,580 690 0
7 125 48,470 6,850 395 0
8 171 78,312 6,680 650 5
9 175 89,260 6,100 555 2
10 195 99,890 6,259 825 2
11 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0
13 265 131,012 8,889 945 9
14 194 69,910 9,650 850 10
15 317 86,080 17,600 1,510 34
16 100 32,000 4,000 750 12
17 0 0 0 0 0
18 333 87,020 18,500 1,680 38
19 181 65,440 9,600 750 5
20 128 39,290 7,550 580 5
21 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0 0
23 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2,850 1,078,800 136,648 12,400 124
Table 1: Customer data per bus.
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Bus Load Shed Vector Residential Commercial
S – M
Industrial
Large
Industrial
2 0.10 3,580 569 26 0
3 0.10 8,320 680 94 0
4 0.10 1,392 600 35 0
6 0.10 6,093 558 69 0
7 0.10 48,470 6850 395 0
Total 67,855 9,257 619 0
Table 2: Customer portion of physical consequences for transmission line 4.
Member Organization
S-1           Management Division
S-2           Transmission Department
S-3           Transmission Department
S-4           Management Division
S-5           Transmission Department
Table 3: Participating members’ affiliation with the electric utility company.
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Economics
Lost Revenue:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility
Weighted
Disutility
6 Hundreds of Millions of Dollars 1.0000 0.2092
5 Tens of Millions of Dollars 0.5409 0.1132
4 Millions of Dollars 0.3684 0.0771
3 Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars 0.1761 0.0368
2 Tens of Thousands of Dollars 0.0687 0.0144
1 Thousands of Dollars 0.0332 0.0069
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Repairs/Replace:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility
Weighted
Disutility
6 Hundreds of Millions of Dollars 1.0000 0.0349
5 Tens of Millions of Dollars 0.5409 0.0189
4 Millions of Dollars 0.3684 0.0129
3 Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars 0.1761 0.0061
2 Tens of Thousands of Dollars 0.0687 0.0024
1 Thousands of Dollars 0.0332 0.0012
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Table 4: Constructed scales for Economics performance measures.
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Image
Public:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility
Weighted
Disutility
4 International media interest 1.0000 0.0388
3 Repeated publications in national media 0.4862 0.0189
2
Repeated publications in local media, appearance in
national media
0.1873 0.0073
1 Single appearance in local media 0.0501 0.0019
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Political:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility
Weighted
Disutility
3 Political push for major regulation reform 1.0000 0.3693
2 Moderate political push for additional regulations 0.3606 0.1332
1 Low political influence on industry regulations 0.1604 0.0592
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Customers:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility
Weighted
Disutility
5 Billions of Dollars 1.0000 0.0977
4 Hundreds of Millions of Dollars 0.5069 0.0495
3 Tens of Millions of Dollars 0.3317 0.0324
2 Millions of Dollars 0.1492 0.0146
1 Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars 0.0566 0.0055
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5: Constructed scales for Image Performance Measures.
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Health & Safety
General Public:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility
Weighted
Disutility
5 Numerous deaths attributed to power outage 1.0000 0.0333
4 Few deaths attributed to power outage 0.5069 0.0169
3
Numerous long-term injuries related to power
outage
0.2460 0.0082
2
Few long-term injuries / numerous short-term
injuries related to power outage
0.1087 0.0036
1 Few Short-term injuries related to power outage 0.0370 0.0012
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Utility Workers:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility
Weighted
Disutility
3
High safety impact on worker associated with
repairs
1.0000 0.1334
2
Moderate safety impact on worker associated with
repairs
0.4358 0.0581
1 Low safety impact on worker associated with repairs 0.0707 0.0094
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Table 6: Constructed scales for Health & Safety performance measures.
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Environment
Fauna:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility
Weighted
Disutility
3
Extensive impact on wildlife, decades required for
full recovery
1.0000 0.0834
2
Moderate impact on wildlife, few years required for
full recovery
0.2842 0.0237
1
Minor impact on wildlife, recovers quickly with no
lingering impacts
0.0686 0.0057
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Table 7: Constructed scales for Environment performance measures.
IC PM Mapping Technique
Lost Revenue Sum
Economic
Repair/Replace Component Specific
Public Consequence Matrix
Political Consequence MatrixImage
Customers Consequence Matrix
General Public Consequence MatrixHealth &
Safety Utility Worker Component Specific
Environment Fauna Inspection
Table 8: PM mapping techniques.
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Commercial S – M Industrial Large Industrial
Duration:P
M
L
ev
el
10 hours 1 day 1 week 10 hours 1 day 1 week 10 hours 1 day 1 week
5 100,000 50,000 30,000 N/A N/A 4,000 N/A N/A N/A
4 10,000 5,000 3,000 3,000 2,000 400 N/A N/A N/A
3 1,000 500 300 300 200 40 N/A 100 20
2 100 50 30 30 20 4 15 10 1
1 10 5 3 3 2 1 2 1 N/A
C
us
to
m
er
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 9: Consequence matrix for Customer PM
Generation Lost – Load Shed
Duration:P
M
L
ev
el
10 hours 1 day 1 week
3 N/A N/A 2000
2 1,00 1,000 500
1 500 500 100Fa
un
a
0 0 0 0
Table 10: Matrix for Fauna PM.
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PM PM
Weight
Level of
Impact
Disutility Weighted
Disutility
Lost Revenue 0.2092 3 0.1761 0.0368
Repair / Replace 0.0349 2 0.0687 0.0024
Public 0.0388 2 0.1873 0.0073
Political 0.3693 0 0.0000 0.0000
Customer 0.0977 3 0.3317 0.0324
General Public 0.0333 0 0.0000 0.0000
Utility Worker 0.1334 1 0.0707 0.0094
Fauna 0.0834 0 0.0000 0.0000
Table 11: Impacts to each PM for transmission line 4.
Level Description
5 – Extreme Completely open, no controls, no barriers
4 – High Unlocked, non-complex barriers (door or access panel)
3 – Moderate Complex barrier, security patrols, video surveillance
2 – Low Secure area, locked, complex closure
1 – Very Low Guarded, secure area, locked, alarmed, complex closure
0 – Zero Completely secure, inaccessible
Table 12: Susceptibility levels of infrastructure elements.
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Susceptibility Levels
zero very low Low Moderate High Extreme
0.0000 – 0.0049 G G G G G G
0.0050 – 0.0299 G B B B B B
0.0300 – 0.0499 G B B Y Y Y
0.0500 – 0.0999 G B Y Y O O
0.1000 – 0.2499 G Y Y O O R
V
al
ue
 L
ev
el
s
≥ 0.2500 B Y O R R R
Table 13:  Susceptibility and value combinations for each vulnerability category.
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Vulnerability
Category
Description
Red This category represents a severe vulnerability in the infrastructure.
It is reserved for the most critical locations that are highly
susceptible to attack.  Red vulnerabilities are those requiring the
most immediate attention.
Orange This category represents the second priority for counter-terrorism
efforts.  These locations are generally moderate to extreme
valuable and moderately to extreme susceptible.
Yellow This category represents the third priority for counter terrorism
efforts.  These locations are normally less vulnerable because
they are either less susceptible or less valuable than the terrorist
desire.
Blue This category represents the fourth priority for counter terrorism
efforts.
Green This is the final category for action.  It gathers all locations not
included in the more severe cases, typically those that are low
(and below) on the susceptibility scale and low (and below) on
the value scale. It is recognized that constrained fiscal resources
is likely to limit efforts in this category, but it should not be
ignored.
Table 14: Infrastructure asset vulnerability categories for ranking element failures due to malevolent
acts.
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Rank Component
Average Load
Shed (MW)
PI
Susceptibility
Level
Vulnerability
Level
1 T-16 734 0.4021 5 – Extreme I (Red)
2 T-17 850 0.4021 5 – Extreme I (Red)
3 T-7 218 0.2583 5 – Extreme I (Red)
4 B-17 1252 0.2246 3 – Moderate II (Orange)
5 B-20 1385 0.2246 3 – Moderate II (Orange)
6 T-14 136 0.2107 5 – Extreme II (Orange)
7 T-15 136 0.2107 5 – Extreme II (Orange)
8 T-13 687 0.1833 5 – Extreme II (Orange)
9 B-3 1075 0.1820 3 – Moderate II (Orange)
10 B-4 879 0.1820 3 – Moderate II (Orange)
Table 15: Top 10 components ranked by vulnerability level for S-1 (minor malevolent acts).
Rank Component
Average Load
Shed (MW)
PI
Failure Frequency
(outages / year) PI
1 T-13 687 0.1833 0.44 0.0806
2 T-5 374 0.1055 0.48 0.0506
3 T-30 136 0.0883 0.54 0.0477
4 T-21 136 0.0883 0.52 0.0459
5 T-2 190 0.0883 0.51 0.0451
6 T-23 415 0.1055 0.38 0.0401
7 T-34 136 0.0883 0.45 0.0398
8 T-12 136 0.0883 0.44 0.0389
9 T-8 239 0.1055 0.36 0.0380
10 T-25-1(2) 136 0.0883 0.41 0.0362
Table 16: Top 10 components ranked according to their expected disutility for S-1 (random failures).
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IC / PM S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5
Economics 0.2441 (2) 0.2849 (2) 0.0614 (4) 0.1088 (3) 0.1991 (2)
Lost Revenue 0.2092 (2) 0.2493 (2) 0.0491 (5) 0.0907 (4) 0.1493 (3)
Repair /
Replace
0.0349 (7) 0.0356 (6) 0.0123 (8) 0.0181 (6) 0.0498 (5)
Image 0.5058 (1) 0.4935 (1) 0.1487 (3) 0.0405 (4) 0.0427 (4)
Public 0.0388 (6) 0.0347 (7) 0.0266 (6) 0.0077 (7) 0.0101 (7)
Political 0.3693 (1) 0.1270 (4) 0.1054 (4) 0.0300 (5) 0.0297 (6)
Customer 0.0977 (4) 0.3318 (1) 0.0167 (7) 0.0028 (8) 0.0029 (8)
Health &
Safety
0.1667 (3) 0.1645 (3) 0.4954 (1) 0.5139 (1) 0.6504 (1)
General Public 0.0333 (8) 0.0274 (8) 0.2477 (2) 0.4111 (1) 0.3252 (1)
Utility Worker 0.1333 (3) 0.1371 (3) 0.2477 (2) 0.1028 (3) 0.3252 (1)
Environment 0.0834 (4) 0.0570 (4) 0.2946 (2) 0.3368 (2) 0.1078 (3)
Fauna 0.0834 (5) 0.0571 (5) 0.2946 (1) 0.3368 (2) 0.1078 (4)
Table 17: Value tree weights (rankings) for each IC and PM by stakeholder.
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Rank S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5
1
T-16 / I
(Red)
T-16 / I
(Red)
T-16 / II
(Orange)
T-16 / II
(Orange)
T-16 / II
(Orange)
2
T-17 / I
(Red)
T-17 / I
(Red)
T-17 / II
(Orange)
T-17 / II
(Orange)
T-17 / II
(Orange)
3
T-7 / I
(Red)
T-7 / I
(Red)
T-7 / II
(Orange)
B-17 / II
(Orange)
B-17 / II
(Orange)
4
B-17 / II
(Orange)
T-14 / I
(Red)
B-17 / II
(Orange)
B-20 / II
(Orange)
B-20 / II
(Orange)
5
B-20 / II
(Orange)
T-15 / I
(Red)
B-20 / II
(Orange)
T-7 / II
(Orange)
T-7 / II
(Orange)
6
T-14 / II
(Orange)
T-13 / I
(Red)
T-13 / II
(Orange)
T-13 / II
(Orange)
T-14 / II
(Orange)
7
T-15 / II
(Orange)
T-8 / II
(Orange)
T-14 / II
(Orange)
T-14 / II
(Orange)
T-15 / II
(Orange)
8
T-13 / II
(Orange)
B-17 / II
(Orange)
T-15 / II
(Orange)
T-15 / II
(Orange)
T-13 / II
(Orange)
9
B-3 / II
(Orange)
B-20 / II
(Orange)
G-13 / III
(Yellow)
G-13 / III
(Yellow)
T-23 / II
(Orange)
10
B-4 / II
(Orange)
B-3 / II
(Orange)
G-18 / III
(Yellow)
B-3 / III
(Yellow)
T-5 / II
(Orange)
Table 18: Top 10 components ranked by vulnerability level for all stakeholders.
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Rank S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5
1
T-13
[0.0806]
T-13
[0.1172]
T-13
[0.0417]
T-13
[0.0320]
T-13
[0.0366]
2
T-5
[0.0506]
T-5
[0.1108]
T-30
[0.0203]
T-30
[0.0145]
T-30
[0.0300]
3
T-30
[0.0477]
T-30
[0.0932]
T-21
[0.0195]
T-21
[0.0140]
T-21
[0.0289]
4
T-21
[0.0459]
T-21
[0.0898]
T-5
[0.0194]
T-2
[0.0137]
T-2
[0.0283]
5
T-2
[0.0451]
T-2
[0.0880]
T-2
[0.0191]
T-5
[0.0131]
T-5
[0.0269]
6
T-23
[0.0401]
T-23
[0.0877]
T-34
[0.0169]
T-34
[0.0121]
T-34
[0.0250]
7
T-34
[0.0398]
T-8
[0.0831]
T-12
[0.0165]
T-12
[0.0118]
T-12
[0.0244]
8
T-12
[0.0389]
T-34
[0.0777]
T-25-1
[0.0154]
T-25-1
[0.0110]
T-25-1
[0.0228]
9
T-8
[0.0380]
T-12
[0.0759]
T-25-2
[0.0154]
T-25-2
[0.0110]
T-25-2
[0.0228]
10
T-25-1(2)
[0.0362]
T-25-1(2)
[0.0709]
T-26
[0.0154]
T-26
[0.0110]
T-26
[0.0228]
Table 19: Top 10 components ranked by expected disutility for all stakeholders.
38
References
                                                
[1] Endrenyi, J., Reliability Modeling in Electric Power Systems.  Toronto: Wiley-
Interscience. 1978
[2] Electric Consumers Resource Council (ELCON).  The economic impacts of the
August 2003 blackout.  2004
[3] Zimmerman, R., Restrepo, C., Dooskin, N., Hartwell, R., Miller, J., Remington,
W., Simonoff, J., Lave, L., Schuler, R.  Electricity Case: Main Report –Rrisk,
Consequences, and Economic Accounting.  CREATE Report available at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/create/reports.php. 2005
[4] Greenburg, M.  Impacts to New Jersey’s Economy of the Loss of Electric Power
in New Jersey’s Urban Industrial Corridor.  CREATE Report available at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/create/reports.php.  2005
[5] Carreras, B.A., Newman, D.E., Dobson, I., Poole, A.B.  Initial evidence for self-
organized criticality in electric power system blackouts.  Proceedings of the 33rd
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.  2000
[6] Chen, J., Thorp, J.S., Parashar, M.  Analysis of electric power system disturbance
data.  Proceedings of the 34th Hawaii International Conference on System
Sciences.  2001
[7] Carreras, B.A., Lynch, V.E., Dobson, I., Newman, D.E.  Critical points and
transitions in an electric power transmission model for cascading failure
blackouts.  Chaos 2002; 12(4):985-94
[8] Nedic, D.P., Dobson, I., Kirschen, D.S., Carreras, B.A., Lynch, V.E.  Criticality in
a cascading failure blackout model.  2006 Accepted for publication in Electric
Power and Energy Systems
[9] Salmeron, J.S., Wood, K., Baldick, R.  Analysis of electric grid security under
terrorist threat.  IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 2004; 19(2):905-12
[10] Bier, V.M., Gratz, E.R., Haphuriwat, N.J., Magua, W., Wierzbicki, K.R.,
Methodology for the identifying near-optimal interdiction strategies for a power
transmission system.  Reliability Engineering and System Safety, accepted for
publication.
[11] Dalton III, J.G., Garrison, D.L., Fallon, C.M.  Value-based reliability transmission
planning.  IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 1996; 11(3):1400-8
[12] Kaplan, S., Garrick, B.J.  On the quantitative definition of risk.  Risk Analysis
1981; 1(1):11-27
[13] Apostolakis, G.E. How useful is Quantitative Risk Assessment? Risk Analysis,
2004; 24(3):515-20
[14] Apostolakis, G.E., Lemon, D.M.  A screening methodology for the identification
and ranking of infrastructure vulnerabilities due to terrorism.  Risk Analysis 2005;
25(2):361-76
[15] Garrick, B.J., Hall, J.E., Kilger, M., McDonald, J.C., O’Toole, T., Probst, P.S.,
Rindskopf Parker, E., Rosenthal, R., Trivelpiece, A.W., Van Arsdale, L.E.,
Zebroski, E.L.  Confronting the risk of terrorism: making the right decisions.
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 2004; 86:129-76
39
                                                                                                                                                
[16] Paté-Cornell, M.E., Guikema, S.  Probabilistic modeling of terrorist threats: a
systems analysis approach to setting priorities among countermeasures.  Military
Operations Research 2002; 7:5-20
[17] Haimes, Y.Y.  Risk modeling, Assessment, and Management.  2nd ed. New York:
Wiley; 2004
[18] Karydas, D.M., and Gifun,  J.F. A methodology for the efficient prioritization of
infrastructure renewal projects.  Reliability Engineering and System Safety 2006;
91: 84-99
[19] Michaud, D., Apostolakis, G.E.  Screening vulnerabilities in water-supply
networks.  Journal of Infrastructure Systems, accepted for publication.
[20] Patterson, S.A., Apostolakis, G.E.  Identification of critical locations across
multiple infrastructures for terrorist actions.  Reliability Engineering and System
Safety, accepted for publication.
[21] Cheok, M.C., Parry, G.W., Sherry, R.R.  Use of importance measures in risk-
informed regulatory applications.  Reliability Engineering and System Safety
1998; 60:213-26.
[22] Zio, E., Podofillini, L., Zille, V.  A combination of Monte Carlo simulation and
cellular automata for computing the availability of complex network systems.
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 2006; 91:181-190.
[23] Richardson, B., Sandia load flow simulation model. Sandia National Laboratories,
Albuquerque, NM., 2005.
[24] Reliability test system task force of the application of probability methods
subcommittee.  The IEEE reliability test system – 1996.  IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems 1999; 14(3):1010-20.
[25] Edison Electric Institute.  Statistical yearbook of electric power industry 2003
data.  Washington D.C. 2003.
[26] IEEE Industry Applications Society.  IEEE recommended practice for the design
of reliable industrial and commercial power systems / sponsor, Power System
Technologies Committee of the IEEE Industry Applications Society.  New York:
Wiley-Interscience; 1980
[27] Saaty TL.  Fundamentals of decision making and priority theory.  Vol. VI.
Pittsburgh: RWS Publications; 2000
[28] Clemen, R. T.  Making Hard Decisions: An Introduction to Decision Analysis.
Belmont: Duxbury Press; 1996.
[29] Apostolakis, GE., Pickett, SE.  Deliberation: integrating analytical results into
environmental decision involving multiple stakeholders.  Risk Analysis 1998;
18(5):621-34
